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I.

INTRODUCTION

Trying to improve a classic can prove perilous. Just ask the guy
who had the bright idea of a "new and better" Coca-Cola. In the field
of casebooks, there are few classics, but Gerald Gunther's Constitutional Law has long been viewed as one of them. More than twenty years
ago it was heralded in the Harvard Law Review as "the Hart and
Wechsler of constitutional law."' After decades of solo authorship,
Gunther is joined on the 13th edition by Kathleen Sullivan,2 who was
primarily responsible for revising (among other sections) the chapters
on freedom of expression.3 This partnership has succeeded in
improving what was already perhaps the strongest section of the book.
In this review I will examine the organization of the free
expression materials, consider the selection and editing of cases, and
comment on the notes and questions. But this casebook is not merely
a teaching tool; it is also a scholarly work bristling with ideas. At the
end of this review I will identify and engage an overarching view that
finds expression in the notes and more subtly in the organization of the
free speech material.
Before beginning a detailed critique, a few overall remarks about
the casebook and its improvement are in order. Over the years, the
strength of the casebook has been its comprehensiveness and the
sophistication with which it approaches constitutional questions. These
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two qualities are interrelated. Both in his casebook and in his other
works, Gunther has had an abiding concern not just with the results
of constitutional adjudication but with the Court's methodology.4
There is thus much discussion of such matters as the proper level of
scrutiny, or whether a balancing or a categorization approach is
preferable.' At a deeper level there is concern with judicial honesty
and integrity.
These methodological issues, however, cannot be examined in a
casebook that contains only skeletal summaries of the cases. Rather,
such an inquiry requires that large sections of important opinions be
reproduced. But there's the rub. More than any other area of the law,
constitutional law is constantly on the move, especially in the area of
individual liberties. Unfortunately for authors of constitutional
casebooks, and for those of us who teach in the area, the dozens of
important constitutional cases decided each year rarely supplant what
has come before; most often they supplement or refine previous
doctrine. Twenty years ago it was still common to have a single
constitutional law course covering federalism, separation of powers and
individual liberties. Today it is difficult even to cover all the basic
material in a single individual liberties course. Making matters worse,
the decisions are often fractured in ways that make it difficult to tell
exactly what the Court has held.
Despite the constant stream of important constitutional decisions
and the proliferation of lengthy separate opinions, Gunther has over
the years fought a gallant battle to avoid editing cases "into a potpourri
of skeletal segments of opinions." 6 By thoughtful editing and case
selection, the 12th edition retained sufficiently full cases to allow
examination of the methods of constitutional adjudication. On the
other hand, due to this methodological emphasis, it seemed to me that
this edition occasionally lost focus on the more basic doctrinal issues.
This problem resulted not because there was too much emphasis on
methodological issues per se, but because increasing doctrinal
complexity required a change in emphasis.
The main improvement of the free speech materials in the 13th
edition is that the proper balance between methodological concern and
doctrinal explication has been restored. In addition, some dated

4. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a ChangingCourt:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Gerald Gunther, The Subtle
Vices of the "Passive Virtues" - A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1968).
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6.
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methodological concerns have been replaced with more contemporary
problems.
II.

ORGANIZATION

The free expression materials in this casebook comprise three
chapters: Chapter 11, "Freedom of Speech-Why Government
Restricts Speech-Unprotected and Less Protected Expression;" 7
Chapter 12, "Freedom of Speech-How Government Restricts
Speech-Modes of Abridgment and Standards of Review;" 8 and
Chapter 13, "Rights Ancillary to Freedom of Speech." 9 The first two
chapters, which together amount to just over 300 pages, supply the
basic free speech material for a constitutional law or individual rights
course. It is on these chapters that I will primarily focus in this
review. The third chapter supplies another 100 pages on "advanced"
topics, and although it might be profitably dipped into to supplement
a basic constitutional law or individual rights course, it is primarily for
use in courses devoted entirely to freedom of expression or in free
speech seminars.
The basic organization represented by the three chapters could not
be better. The trick was not so much how to divide the basic material
from the advanced, for this is fairly obvious. Rather, the problem was
how to coherently organize the ever growing mass of basic materials.
By dividing this material into one chapter that focuses on the nature
of the speech being regulated and another that focuses on the nature
of the regulation, the authors underscore an important development in
modern doctrine. A subtle but important change in the free speech
jurisprudence that has marked the last twenty years has been the
Court's growing emphasis on the nature of the regulation (e.g., whether
the regulation is content oriented or content neutral) rather than on the
nature of the speech (e.g., is speech protected or unprotected). Thus
the division between Chapters 11 and 12 neatly calls attention to this
trend while at the same presenting the material in more or less
chronological order.
Chapter 11 is subdivided into 6 sections: (1) Free Speech: An
Overview;" (2) Incitement;" (3) Fighting Words and Hostile
Audiences; 12 (4) Injury to Reputation and Sensibility; 3 (5) Sexually
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1022-1202.
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Id. at 1361-1460.
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Explicit Material; 4 and (6) Commercial Speech. i" This organization
is quite sensible and in one important respect improves upon the 12th
edition.
Immediately after the materials on incitement, the previous edition
had a section entitled "Content Regulations Assertedly Warranting
Reduced or No First Amendment Protection: Categorization or
The section focused on the categorical exclusion
Balancing."'"6
approach first adopted by the Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,"' and demonstrated both the frailties of this methodology and
its evolution into the more speech protective "definitional balancing"
approach of New York Times v. Sullivan. 8 Within this methodological framework, this section of the previous edition enveloped cases on
fighting words, libel, privacy, obscenity, pornography, hate speech,
offensive and indecent speech and commercial speech.' 9 The current
edition breaks up this large, somewhat unwieldy section into smaller
sections denominated by the type of speech at issue (i.e., sections 3-6
listed above).2" Discussion of methodology is by no means abandoned, but by eliminating it as a central organizing theme in this
section the new edition strikes a better balance between exploring
methodology and explicating what the law is.
If the strongest part of previous editions of the casebook was its
free speech section, then the strongest part of the free speech section
was the incitement materials. This section begins with Schenck v.
United States,21 in which Justice Holmes announces the "clear and
present danger" test. 22 As an abstract matter, the test promised to
strike the proper balance between protecting the dissent essential to a
democracy and allowing government to avoid those harms that all
organized government must have the power to prevent. Yet as the
cases selected in the casebook demonstrate (perhaps most notably a
case which upheld the conviction of the Socialist presidential candidate,
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Eugene Debs, for criticizing American involvement in World War
I),23 Holmes' test inadequately protected dissent essential to a
democracy.
Two years before Schenck, Learned Hand, then a young district
court judge, took a different approach. Rather than focusing on the
imminency of the danger, Hand, in Masses Publishing v. Patten,
inquired whether the words used objectively advocated the commission
of the crime.24 Although meeting with "practically no professional
approval whatever" when decided,2" this case would, as the casebook
demonstrates, have an important influence on modern doctrine.26 As
Professor Kenneth Karst pointed out in a 1976 review of the 9th
edition of the casebook, it was Gunther who first introduced modern
constitutional law students to this belatedly seminal decision. 7
Discussion prompted by the materials in the incitement section
about what went wrong with the Court's early attempt to draw the line
between protected and unprotected political advocacy has for me been
a highlight of constitutional law class both as a student and a teacher.
Similarly, the progression from the early "clear and present danger"
cases to the modern incitement test provides an elegant example of
constitutional law evolving in the best common law tradition. The
materials show how Hand's emphasis on the objective language of
incitement was kept alive in Brandeis' concurrence in Whitney v.
2 8 and masterfully utilized by Harlan in latter Smith Act
California
cases.29 The modern test announced in Brandenburg v. Ohio3" thus
combines "the best of Hand and Holmes"-"the most protective
ingredients of Hand's incitement emphasis in Masses with the31most
useful elements of Holmes' clear and present danger heritage.,
In the 13th edition the authors have the good sense to leave
superb enough alone. They make only minor revisions to the

23. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), reprinted in GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra
note 2, at 1038.
24. 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917), reprinted in GUNTHER &
SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1046.
25. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1049 n.1 (quoting Learned Hand from one
of his letters discussed in GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE
160 (1994)).
26. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1074.
27. Karst, supra note 1, at 1030.
28. 274 U.S. 357, (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), reprinted in GUNTHER & SULLIVAN,
supra note 2, at 1054, 1055.
29. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); and Noto v. United States, 367 U.S.
290 (1961), discussed in GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1068-69.
30. 395 U.S. 444 (1969), reprinted in GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1071.
31. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1074.
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incitement section, most of which are helpful. The rather verbose
section heading, "Regulation of Political Speech Because of Its
Content," is concisely revised to "Incitement. 3 2 In addition, a preBrandenburg case, Bond v. Floyd,33 which appeared after Brandenburg
in the 12th edition,3 4 now comes before Brandenburg.3" Another preBrandenburg decision, Watts v. United States,3 6 is similarly moved
before Brandenburg. Unlike Bond, however, which like the World War
I cases, involved political advocacy that arguably promoted illegal
conduct (draft resistance)37 Watts involved an alleged threat against
the President of the United States.38 It seems to me that this case
more properly belongs in the very useful note on the scope of
Brandenburg.9
The next section, "Fighting Words and Hostile Audiences," is
substantially revised.4" As mentioned above, these two topics, which
in the previous edition were included within a much more comprehensive section, are now placed together in a separate section. In addition,
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, in which the Court upheld the
conviction of a proselytizing Jehovah's Witness for calling a law
enforcement official a "damned fascist,"" is usefully juxtaposed with
Cantwell v. Connecticut.42
In Cantwell, the Court reversed the
conviction of a proselytizing Jehovah's Witness who offended a street
corner audience by playing a record condemning organized religion,
particularly the Roman Catholic Church, as instruments of Satan.43
This pairing forces the student to focus on the narrow scope of the
"fighting words" doctrine (i.e., face-to-face use of abusive epithets),
while at the same time testing the coherence of this limitation. (In the
previous edition, Cantwell did not appear until late into the next
chapter as part of the public forum materials).

32. Compare, GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1034 with GUNTHER, supra note
5, at 1008.
33. 385 U.S. 116 (1966), discussed in GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1070.
34.
35.

GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 1067.
GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1070.

36. 394 U.S. 705 (1969), discussed in GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1071.
37. Bond, 385 U.S. 116 (1966), discussed in GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1070.
38. Speaking at an anti-Vietnam war rally Watts declared: "If they ever make me carry a
rifle, the first man I want to get my sights on is L.B.J." Id. at 706, reprinted in GUNTHER &
SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1071.
39. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1075.
40. Id. at 1076-91.
41. 315 U.S. 568 (1942), discussed in GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1077, 1078.
42. 310 U.S. 296 (1940), discussed in GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1076.
43. Id.
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Even more significantly, Cohen v. California, one of cornerstones
of modern free speech jurisprudence, is introduced in this section."
While perhaps more logically reserved to a section on offensive and
lower value speech as it was in the 12th edition,45 or until the chapter
on content-discriminatory regulations, where it makes a reappearance
in the present edition, this early introduction is again justified by its
bracketing of the "fighting words" rationale. Similarly, the placement
of the entire topic of "hostile audiences" in this section, rather than in
the section on public forums where it previously was found, serves to
complete the overview of attempts to regulate speech because of its
power to offend or anger listeners. On the other hand, the cases on
permit requirements that follow (Kunz v. New York 46 and Forsyth
County v. NationalistMovement47 ), although underscoring the problem
of unbridled discretion inherent in the "hostile audience" doctrine,
seem premature and perhaps should have been reserved to the public
forum discussion in Chapter 12.
The material dealing with First Amendment limitations on libel
actions and other dignitary torts, expounded in New York Times v.
Sullivan" and its progeny, is quite properly given its own section in
this new edition." In the introductory notes to this section, entitled
"Injury to Reputation and Sensibility,"" the authors explain that the
section does not cover the doctrine in detail, leaving such coverage for
courses in torts and media law, but rather focuses "on the Court's
methodology in bringing [this area of tort law] into the First Amendment ballpark, and on the bearing of the Court's analysis on other
First Amendment problems."'" Despite the emphasis on methodology, the cases and notes in this section nonetheless provide a clear,
concise, yet fairly comprehensive overview of this area of the law.
The next section is on hate speech, and here the authors faced a
dilemma. The only modern Supreme Court ruling on the merits of a
hate speech regulation is R.A. V v. City of St. Paul, which reversed the
conviction of a youth for burning a cross on a black family's lawn."
R.A. V is a prime example of the Court's tendency to focus on the

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

403 U.S. 15 (1971), reprintedin GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1081.
GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 1138.
340 U.S. 290 (1951), discussed in GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1090.
505 U.S. 123 (1992), reprinted in GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1090.
376 U.S. 254 (1964), reprinted in GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1094.
GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1091-1125.
Id. at 1091-92.
Id.
505 U.S. 377 (1992), reprinted in GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1115.
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nature of the regulation rather than the nature of the speech. The
Court makes clear that such reprehensible conduct is not protected
speech and thus could have been constitutionally punished pursuant to
any number of statutes.5 3 Nevertheless, it reverses the conviction
because it was obtained pursuant to a content-oriented regulation of
54
unprotected speech.
For two reasons, introducing R.A. V. at this point in the materials
is problematic. First, the decision turns on the distinction between
content-neutral and content-oriented regulations,5 5 a distinction not
considered until the next chapter. S6 In addition, the expression
involved (cross burning) is symbolic conduct, another topic not
explored until the next chapter." Second, a chapter on hate speech
without R.A. V is like playing Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark.
Moreover, the decision offers an interesting reprise of the fighting
words doctrine: although the statute at issue was in fact a quite
broadly worded hate speech regulation, the Minnesota Supreme Court
construed it to ban only racial fighting words.5 "
The authors recognize this dilemma, but opt for including R.A. V.
at this point in the materials. In their view, postponing R.A. V. until
the next chapter "would leave unfinished the hate speech discussion,
which makes sense to conduct right after the discussion of incitement,
fighting words and Beauharnais."5 9 It's a tough call, but I think that
it would have been preferable to reserve R.A.V for the materials on
the distinction between content-oriented and content-neutral regulation.
The solution to the problem of "the unfinished hate speech discussion"
is not to start it, at least in a major way, in this chapter.
Unlike fighting words, libel or obscenity, there has never been any
indication in the case law that racist speech is categorically "outside"
the ambit of the First Amendment; nor, unlike pornography, has there
ever been any indication that racist speech is "lower value" expression.
It is true that some academic commentary has argued for categorically
excluding racist speech from constitutional protection, and thus a note
considering this possibility and the Court's rejection of it is certainly

53.

Id.

54.

Id. at 1115-17.

55.

Id. at 1117.

56.

GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1203-34.

57. Id.
58. RA. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 123 (1992), reprintedin GUNTHER & SULLIVAN,
supra note 2, at 1115, 1117.
59. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, TEACHER'S MANUAL 135 (13th

ed. 1997) [hereinafter TEACHER'S MANUAL].
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in order. But an entire section at this point in the book seems
unwarranted. This conclusion is fortified by the fact that the other
recent developments considered in this section mostly concern the
regulation of hate speech on campus. This problem involves the
government's power to regulate speech in its capacity as an educator
or employer, a topic that is not discussed until the second section of
the next chapter.6"
The hate speech section is followed by a section entitled "Sexually
Explicit Expression," and includes materials on obscenity and
pornography.6 1 With regard to the cases on regulation of sexually
explicit but nonobscene expression, the authors faced a problem similar
to the one they confronted in the hate speech section. The case law in
this area (especially Renton v. Playtime Theatres62 and its dubious
secondary effects rationale) requires a firm understanding of the
distinction between content-neutral and content-oriented regulations.
But unlike their handling of hate speech, here I think the authors were
correct in including this material where they did. Regulation of
sexually explicit but nonobscene expression is intimately connected
with obscenity regulation; a discussion of the constitutional doctrine of
obscenity is just not complete without discussion of nonobscene
pornography. No such intimate relationship exists between hate speech
and any other topic in this chapter. In any event, the difficulties of
presenting cases that invoke the distinction between content-neutral
and content-based regulations in both this and the hate speech section
could have been mitigated somewhat if this chapter included a short
preview of that distinction.
The next section is dedicated to commercial speech63 and nicely
rounds out a chapter that traces the refinement, and to a large extent
abandonment, of the categorical exclusion methodology. For me the
most important lesson taught by this survey is that an approach to
speech regulation that may seem entirely sensible as an abstract matter
may prove entirely unworkable in practice. But the material supplied
by Gunther and Sullivan is sufficiently rich and generally well
organized that there are many other lessons to be learned as well.
Chapter 12 is divided into three sections: (1) The Distinction
Between Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulations;6 4 (2)
Government's Power to Limit Speech in its Capacity as Proprietor,
60. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1234-1325.

61. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1125-74.
62. 475 U.S. 41 (1986), discussed in GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1162-64.
63. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1174-1202.

64. Id. at 1203-34.
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Employer and Patron;65 and (3) Impermissible Forms of Speech
Restrictive Law: Overbreadth, Vagueness and Prior Restraint.6 6 The
overall organization of material into a chapter focusing on how
government regulates speech, with special emphasis on the distinction
between content-oriented and content-neutral regulation, is both
innovative and sensible. However, a few of the specific organizational
choices within this framework are questionable.
At the beginning of section 1, the authors divide content-based
regulation into four categories: (1) viewpoint restrictions; (2) subject
matter restrictions; (3) speaker restrictions; and (4) communicative
impact on the audience.67 This is a laudable attempt to bring order
to a messy area of the law. The first three categories are firmly rooted
in case law; the fourth, however, especially as explicated in the
casebook, is problematic.
Introducing this fourth category, the authors tell us that "[l]aws
barring speech that is deemed likely to cause a certain response in the
audience based on its content are typically viewed as skeptically as
direct content restrictions."6 As examples the authors list Forsyth
Co. v. NationalistMovement, which invalidated a regulation gearing the
69
price of a parade permit to the anticipated hostility of the audience,
and Cohen v. California, which reversed the conviction of an antiwar
protester for wearing a jacket bearing the message, "Fuck the
Draft. "7"
But in what sense is Cohen any less a direct content restriction
than subject matter or viewpoint restrictions? Cohen, it seems to me,
is more properly included, along with the flag burning cases, in a
separate category of regulations forbidding the use of offensive words
or symbols. (Or perhaps in a slightly larger but somewhat more vague
category of laws that seek to protect "civility norms," i.e., those
conventions designed to protect people's sensibilities.) Cases like
Forsyth Co. could then be assigned to a category of indirect content
restrictions, or perhaps more generally to a residual category of all
other restrictions that turn on audience reaction to the speech.
A significant improvement over previous editions is that the all
important test for content-neutral "time, place, and manner" restrictions makes a prominent appearance by way of contrast at the end of

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 1234-1325.
Id. at 1325-60.
Id. at 1204-08.
GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1208.
505 U.S. 123 (1992), discussed in GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1208.
403 U.S. 15 (1971), reprinted in GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1208.
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the discussion of content-based laws.71 But this good work is
somewhat undone by beginning the subsection on content-neutral laws,
not with the basic "time, place, and manner" cases, but with the much
more complex symbolic conduct cases.72 Exploration of even the
basic "time, place, and manner" cases are postponed until the public
forum cases in the next section.73 In my view, this is a mistake.
While it is true that the tests for symbolic conduct and content-neutral
"time, place, and manner" restrictions amount to the same thing, I find
it preferable to acquaint students with the easily understandable "time,
place, and manner" cases before dealing with the metaphysical
abstrusities raised by the symbolic speech cases.
Of course, placing the symbolic content cases ahead of the "time,
place, and manner" cases might be understandable if Gunther and
Sullivan were trying to emphasize the importance of the
speech/conduct distinction. But the authors, who are quite critical of
this distinction,74 tend to minimize its importance.
Section 2 is entitled "Government's Power to Limit Speech in Its
Capacity as Proprietor, Educator, Employer and Patron."7 " This
section, which has no counterpart in previous editions, underscores the
fact that the strong presumption against government engaging in
content-based speech regulations often disappears when government
acts, not in its usual sovereign capacity, but as a proprietor or
manager. 6 This is a very important point often neglected in basic
constitutional law courses. My one small criticism of this section is
that its title does not encompass the subsection on public forums.
Contrary to what is most likely an inadvertent implication of the title,
the public forum cases often involve government acting in its sovereign
capacity.
Section 3 completes the discussion on how government regulates
speech, introducing material on overbreadth, vagueness and prior
restraint. 77 These are highly technical areas of the law and are
properly reserved for last. Just enough material is included to give
students a basic understanding of the doctrine without overwhelming

71.
72.
73.

74.
75.

GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1209 -11.
Id. at 1212.
Id. at 1244-60.
See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1216.
GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1234.

76. Id. at 1235-1325.
77. Id. at 1325-60.
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them. The subsection on prior restraint, moreover, usefully separates
the licensing from the injunction cases.78
Whereas Chapters 11 and 12 comprehensively cover the basic free
speech material, Chapter 13, entitled "Rights Ancillary to the First
Amendment," collects the "advanced" material.79 It is divided into
four sections: (1) Compelled Speech: The Right Not to Speak;8" (2)
Freedom of Association;8 (3) Money and Political Campaigns;8 2 and
(4) Freedom of the Press.8 3 This basic division is sensible and
properly includes political contributions and expenditures as a featured
topic. Although most of the material in this chapter is not geared for
use in basic constitutional law courses, an instructor wanting to
supplement the basic course with a few select "advanced" topics (e.g.,
the different treatment of the broadcast and print media) will find this.
chapter useful. Its primary use, though, is for a course dedicated to
the First Amendment, or as a resource for a seminar devoted to
advanced topics in free speech.
The materials in these three chapters are, in my view, more
comprehensive and better organized than casebooks recently on the
market dedicated entirely to the First Amendment. While I question
a few of the organizational details, the organization of the free speech
materials in the 13th edition is generally quite good, and in a few
places even inspired.
III.

CASE SELECTION AND EDITING

The case selection is near perfect: The most important cases and
ones that best explicate doctrine and methodology are included as
principal cases; other cases needed for a full understanding of an area
are included as "squib" cases or are described in the notes. There is
a refreshing absence of that idiosyncratic case selection that too often
plagues legal casebooks. Indeed, I can find only one selection to
question-the inclusion of Clark v. Community for Creative NonViolence as a principal case. 4 Clark rejected a First Amendment
challenge to a National Park Service regulation that prohibited camping
in certain parks.8" The regulation was challenged by activists who

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.

84.
85.

at
at
at
at
at
at

1339-60.
1361.
1361-74.
1374-1400.
1400-20.
1420-60.

468 U.S. 288 (1984), reprinted in GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1254.
Id.
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wanted to sleep in a Washington D.C. park to call attention to the
plight of the homeless.8 6 Although these facts raise some interesting
theoretical issues, as a doctrinal matter the result seems clearly
controlled by O'Brien and the recent "time, place, and manner" cases.
As such, it seems hardly worth the nearly five and half pages of text
devoted to it.
One of the best features of previous editions of the casebook was
the case editing. This edition continues in the tradition of including
enough of the case to give the reader access to the Court's arguments
and methodology, but at the same time not burying the reader with
unnecessary detail. With so many cases to prune, though, even the
most thoughtful editors will occasionally leave out material that should
have been included. One such instance in this book is in the editing
of R.A. V., the bizarre hate speech case discussed above. 7
One explanation of R.A. V is that the Court's hostility to the
speech regulation at issue was prompted by the plainly viewpointoriented justification of the ordinance proffered by the city and the
Minnesota Supreme Court. Thus the Court notes that the Minnesota
court "repeatedly emphasized" that the prohibition was aimed at
"messages 'based on virulent notions of racial supremacy,' '..' and that
St. Paul argued that "a general 'fighting words' law would not meet the
city's needs because only a content-specific measure can communicate
to minority groups that the 'group hatred' aspect of such speech 'is not
condoned by the majority..'89 The authors, however, leave out this
important (perhaps even essential) part of the opinion.
The only other significant omission I noticed was in the hate
crimes case, Wisconsin v. Mitchell.9 In this case the state argued that
a law increasing the penalty for bias-motivated crimes did not punish
bigoted thought but instead punished only "conduct."'"
While
acknowledging that the state's argument is "literally correct," and also
observing that the conduct at issue was not "by any stretch of the
imagination expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment,"92
the Court nonetheless stated that this argument "does not dispose of
Mitchell's First Amendment challenge."9 3 This statement is both

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 1254-55.
See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
505 U.S. 377 at 392.
Id.
508 U.S. 476 (1993), discussed in GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1123.
Id.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 484.
Id. at 476.
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doctrinally interesting and important: interesting because it raises the
issue of why a physical assault is categorically excluded from the realm
of expressive conduct, even if otherwise meeting the test for expressive
conduct;9 4 it is important because for the first time the Court suggests
that even the regulation of nonexpressive conduct is entitled to some
level of First Amendment scrutiny.
The authors' failure to include this statement most likely stems
from the organizational problem with the hate speech section mentioned above. Mitchell, quite naturally, is included in the hate speech
section, immediately after R.A.V.95 Because the topics of symbolic
speech and the speech/conduct distinction have not yet been introduced, however, the significance of the material quoted above would
not be apparent to the students. Rather than omit the materil
altogether, the authors might have included it in the later discussion of
symbolic speech and the speech/conduct distinction.96
Despite diligent effort, I have found very little to criticize in the
case selection and editing. My few criticisms should therefore be seen
as praising with faint damns.

IV. NOTES AND QUESTIONS
In reviewing the Ninth edition of the book more than twenty
years ago, Kenneth Karst wrote that the notes and questions "will
stimulate inquiry and deepen understanding for students both on and
off the classroom platform."9 7 The same is true of the notes and
questions in the free speech materials in this edition. Indeed, these
notes and questions are in one respect an improvement over previous
editions, for here the introductory materials do an even better job of
setting the stage.
Particularly helpful are the series of hypotheticals and follow-up
questions at the beginning of Chapter 12 that introduce the distinction
between content-based and content-neutral restrictions.9"
These

94. Compare Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (finding flag burning to be
expressive conduct because there was "[a]n intent to convey a particularized message and ... the
likelihood was great that the message would be understood be those who viewed it.") (citing
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)).
95. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1109-25.
96. Perhaps what is really at issue here is substantive disagreement with the authors'
apparent view that the speech/conduct distinction is not ultimately a very important one. To me
this distinction is as basic as the content-based/content-neutral distinction (although not nearly
as often litigated). Thus, as the authors acknowledge (GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at
1123), a sharp speech/conduct distinction is the only way to reconcile Mitchell with RA.V.
97. Karst, supra note 1, at 1028 n.3.
98. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1203-04.
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hypotheticals99 neatly demonstrate not only the distinction -between
content-based and content-neutral restrictions, but also explore
different types of content-based and content-neutral restrictions. The
hypotheticals are followed by a note that observes that "while each of
these laws would have the identical effect" of preventing certain speech
(in this case, speech in favor of Republican candidates), "the Court
would scrutinize them quite differently.' 0'° The authors then inquire
as to why this should be so.'
As in the previous editions, the notes and questions following the
principal cases provide both a scholarly discussion of ideas as well as
a guide to understanding the doctrinal landscape. A good example of
the scholarly quality of the notes is the material following Virginia
Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.1°2 In a note
entitled "Commercial Speech And First Amendment Theory," the
authors discuss the various theoretical justifications for protecting
commercial advertising, such as self-government, truth and autonomy.'0 3 But the notes in this section also elucidate doctrine by, for
instance, focusing on the definition of commercial speech0 4 and by
explaining the division within the Court as to level of scrutiny
applicable to regulations of such speech.0 5
Similarly helpful are the notes about the scope of Brandenburg,
which ask about the applicability of that case to such areas as the
communication of information that may lead to crimes;0 6 the notes
in the section on the public forum that describe two different approaches to the problem;107 the notes for the material on speech in

99. Suppose that a municipality enacted laws prohibiting the construction or
maintenance, even on private property, of:
1. any billboard supporting a Republican candidate
2. any political billboard
3. any political message on a billboard owned by a Republican
4. any billboard tending to arouse political anger or hostility
5. any billboard
6. any structure, except a building, exceeding 12 feet in height
7. any message on a billboard during the three weeks preceding a general election
8. any billboard in any area zoned for residential use
9. any billboard larger than 12 by 40 feet.
Id. at 1204-05.
100. Id. at 1204.
101. Id.
102. 425 U.S. 748 (1976), reprinted in GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1176-81.
103. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1181-85.
104. Id. at 1184.
105. Id. at 1201-02.
106. Id. at 1075.
107. Id. at 1268.
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public schools, which emphasize that unlike the public forum, "[t]he
classroom is a place of structured dialogue bounded by teacher
authority and rules of decorum; ' ' and the introductory notes on
sexually explicit but nonobscene speech that concisely explicate
doctrine in a particularly murky area of the law. °9
My sole criticism of the notes and questions relates to the material
in the general introduction to the free speech materials (section 1 of
chapter 11). The notes on First Amendment history and theory are
useful, although perhaps a touch too long. But the subsection entitled
"First Amendment Jurisprudence" is far too lengthy and much too
detailed for an introductory note."'
Excerpts from the abstruse
debate between Justices Black and Frankfurter about absolutes or
balancing are sure to go right over the heads of students who have not
yet read their first free speech case. Similarly, the materials on
"Justifying special protection for speech" seem dated, and in any event,
are not worth nearly two pages of text."' In contrast, the discussion
of categorization versus balancing is of more contemporary importance." 2 But even here the details of this discussion, along with
some of the materials on history and theory, would perhaps be more
helpful if integrated into later sections rather than presented as
introductory material.
This discussion of notes and questions would not be complete
without mentioning the teacher's manual. This is the first edition of
the casebook to include a teacher's manual and the entire enterprise is
better for it. The manual concisely summarizes each major area of the
law covered in the casebook and candidly gives the authors' view of the
questions it poses. 1 3 It thus serves as a miniconstitutional law
treatise geared to the casebook. In addition, it offers useful hypotheti1 14
cals for classroom use.
This is not to say that I agree with all of the answers or approaches in the manual. Like the casebook itself, the manual is full of ideas;
it is not surprising, therefore, that others who spend their time
thinking about free speech issues might find something with which to
disagree. To honor the scholarly nature of this casebook and teacher's
manual, I will end this review by engaging one of the many interesting

108. Id. at 1293.
109. Id. at 1155-56.
110. Id. at 1029-34.
111. Id. at 1031-32.
112. Id. at 1032-34.
113. TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 59.
114. See, e.g., id. at 129-30.
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ideas raised in these materials. I will begin by taking issue with a
comment in the teacher's manual which, although not itself of
overarching importance, reflects a deeper, more significant area of
disagreement.
In the teacher's manual, Gunther and Sullivan correctly state that
the Court in Chaplinsky offers three justifications for excluding fighting
words from First Amendment protection: "1. they're unnecessarily
vulgar ('no essential part of any exposition of ideas'), 2. they offend the
listener ('by their very utterance inflict injury'), or 3. they trigger
115
fistfights ('tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace').
Much more controversially, the authors contend that after Cohen,
which upheld the right of an antiwar protester to wear a jacket in
public with the message "Fuck the Draft," only the third justification
survives."'
"After Cohen," they insist, "vulgarity is protected
insofar as the medium is the message, and offense to the listener is not
117
enough to regulate speech."
I disagree that Cohen is inconsistent with either Chaplinsky's
"inflict[ion] of [psychic] injury" rationale or its "no essential part of
any exposition of ideas" basis. Gunther and Sullivan overlook that in
Cohen the Court emphasized that the state had no power to excise
offensive words from, as Justice Harlan put it, "the public discourse.'.
Later in that opinion Harlan explained that the First
Amendment "is designed and intended to remove governmental
restraints from the arena of public discussion ...,"1' But not all
human utterances are part of "the public discourse" or "arena of public
discussion."' 2 0 The line between public discourse and other speech
is difficult, perhaps impossible, to draw. But in Chaplinsky the Court
distinctly put face-to-face verbal assaults on the "not public discourse"
side of the line. 2 ' This is the significance of its finding such expression to be "no essential part of any exposition of ideas."
Nothing in Cohen suggests that the Court has changed its mind
and now finds "fighting words" to be part of public discourse. To the
contrary, the Court goes to great lengths to explain why the message

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 59, at 130.
Id. at 130.
Id.
403 U.S. at 15, 22.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 25.
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568, 571.
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on Cohen's jacket was not "fighting words.' 1 22 Relatedly, and more
significantly, nothing in Cohen suggests that its holding, disabling the
state from barring the use of offensive language, applies beyond the
sphere of "public discourse" or "the arena of public discussion." It is
true that other decisions have cast doubt on the continued validity of
the fighting words doctrine. 1 3 But none of these decisions has taken
issue with Chaplinsky's insight that such directed verbal abuse is not,
as an abstract matter, properly part of the public debate essential to
either the discovery of truth or democratic self- governance.
The problem with the fighting words doctrine has been one of
practical administration, most crucially in its misapplication to speech
that is part of the debate on matters of public concern. (Chaplinsky
itself may be an example of this.) Additionally, there has been the
troubling tendency of law enforcement officials to selectively apply
fighting words restrictions to the politically unpopular. 124 But to the
extent that the fighting words doctrine does survive, the infliction of
emotional injury rationale does also. Thus, contrary to Gunther and
Sullivan's suggestion, I very much doubt the Court would reverse a
fighting words conviction that it would otherwise be inclined to uphold
just because there was no danger that the verbal assault would lead to
physical violence (e.g., the fighting words were addressed to a
quadriplegic). Certainly nothing in Cohen, or in any other of the
Court's decisions, forecloses the state from protecting against unprovoked, intentional infliction of emotional injury outside of the realm of
pubic discourse. 2 '
A prevalent misconception about modern First Amendment
doctrine, even among those who should know better, is that the strong
presumption against content discrimination, represented by Cohen and
similar cases, applies to all government regulation of expression. I
recently attended a faculty seminar by a prominent law professor who
argued (or more accurately, assumed) that Cohen's suspension of
civility norms applies to the public school classroom. In their

122. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), reprinted in GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra
note 2, at 1082-83.
123. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (reversing "fighting words"
conviction on overbreadth grounds), discussed in GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1079.
As the authors of the casebook point out, the Court "has not sustained aconviction on the basis
of the fighting words doctrine since Chaplinsky." GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1078.
124. Gooding, for instance, involved a black antiwar protester involved in an altercation with
a white Georgia policeman. Id. at 1079.
125. For an elaboration of this point see Robert Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public
Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103
HARV. L. REV. 601 (1990).
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organization of and introductory notes to the material entitled
"Government's Power to Limit Speech in Its Capacity as Proprietor,
Educator, Employer and Patron," Gunther and Sullivan quite properly
emphasize that this is not the case.126 But even here lurks what is in
my view a problem related to these authors' overreading of Cohen as
nullifying all but Chaplinsky's risk of violence rationale.
The basic organization of the casebook suggests a general rule that
content-based regulation of speech is presumptively unconstitutional,
except where government acts other than in its usual lawmaking
sovereign capacity (e.g., as proprietor, educator, employer or patron).
Specifically, this organization suggests that if government is not acting
in any of these other capacities, but is regulating speech in its usual
sovereign capacity, the "usual" rule against content discrimination
applies. While this is a plausible way to describe modern free speech
jurisprudence, I suggest that it may have more of a normative element
to it than Gunther and Sullivan perhaps realize.
In my view a more accurate description of the general First
Amendment landscape is this: The strong protection of speech
represented by the rule against content discrimination, and particularly
the suspension of civility norms represented by cases such Cohen and
the flag burning cases, is limited primarily to the realm of debate on
matters of public concern.127 More specifically, even when government is regulating speech in its usual sovereign capacity there is no
general rule against content discrimination. This position is supported
by cases such as Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders,"28 which,
in stark contrast to cases such as New York Times v. Sullivan 29 and
Gertz v. Welch, 3 ' found that the First Amendment did not impose
limitations on state law defamation actions where a private plaintiff
This position
sought recovery for speech not of public concern.'
is also supported by the numerous content-based restrictions that

126. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1293.
127. For an elaboration of this view see James Weinstein, A BriefIntroduction to Free Speech
Doctrine, 29 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 461, 468-69 (1997). For the view that the suspension of civility
norms represented by Cohen and the flag burning cases is limited exclusively to the realm of
public discourse, see Robert C. Post, Community and the FirstAmendment, 29 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 473,
481 (1997). For criticism of Post's perspective and the usefulness of the concept of "public
discourse" in free speech jurisprudence, see Paul Bender, Comment on Robert C. Post's Community
and the FirstAmendment, 29 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 485 (1997). See also Robert C. Post, Reply to Bender,
29 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 495 (1997).
128. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
129. 376 U.S. 254 (1964), reprinted in GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1094.
130. 418 U.S. 323 (1974), discussed in GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 1102.
131. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. at 749.
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government routinely places on financial speech (e.g., rules regulating
insider trading or the content of proxy statements), which no one
seriously thinks violate the First Amendment.
In organizing the materials and writing the notes and question in
the 13th edition of Constitutional Law, Gunther and Sullivan exhibit
the objectivity and detachment that most scholars cherish but few
attain. But in a work of this magnitude it is impossible (and perhaps
not even desirable) to completely separate the descriptive from the
normative. Thus Gunther and Sullivan's free speech materials may
represent a somewhat more speech-protective and autonomy-based
perspective than other scholarly accounts.
V.

CONCLUSION

The free speech materials in the 13th edition of Gunther and
Sullivan's Constitutional Law materials are well organized, the case
selection and editing peerless, the notes and questions informative and
stimulating. In my view these are the best materials on the market,
either for use in a basic constitutional law course or one dedicated
solely to free speech. I might add that, as a prominent constitutional
law practitioner wrote about a previous edition, 132 this casebook will
also prove enormously valuable to lawyers involved in free speech
cases. And needless to say, any one involved in First Amendment
scholarship should have this book close at hand.
As good as the free speech materials were in previous editions,
these materials in the 13th edition are even better, combining the best
of Gunther and Sullivan.

132. John Frank, Book Review, 68 ABA JOURNAL 593 (1982).

